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Abstract: We review the economics of superstars, originally developed for stars in 
traditional media, and discuss whether they are applicable for the (allegedly) novel 
phenomenon of stars in social media (influencer, micro-celebrities). Moreover, we 
analyse potentially new factors for creating social media superstardom that may be 
special to the nature of social media. Our overall result is that the economics of su-
perstars, like the role of talent, market concentration effects, MacDonald-style and 
Adler-style effects, remain applicable and relevant for social media stars. In line with 
this assessment, we find that several (allegedly) new star factors in social media, like 
user-generated content, prosumption, disappearance of gatekeepers and authentic-
ity, turn out to be only partly applicable or just slightly different to traditional con-
cepts. However, algorithm management and upload strategies represent novel suc-
cess factors relevant for social media superstardom that are not captured by tradi-
tional superstar theories. 
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1. Introduction 
Social media stars (also called: influencers, creators, micro-celebrities, online stars, 
etc.) are content providers on social media platforms, who become very popular with 
considerable reach and big audiences, as e.g. the YouTube gamer DanTDM (Daniel 
Middleton) with 19 million subscribers (July 2018; YouTube 2018a) or Instagram fit-
ness-star Kayla Itsines with 9.8 million subscribers (July 2018; Instagram 2018). Alt-
hough social media content provider or “influencer” is not yet broadly established as 
a “proper profession”, the income of these stars underlines the professional quality 
and commercial dimension of the business. According to Forbes (Robehmed & Berg 
2018), the top 10 YouTube stars earned an aggregated 180.5 million US dollars in 
2018. Daniel Middleton alone ranks the highest-paid gaming star with an estimated 
income of 18 million US dollars. Yet, not only the economic power of social media 
stars makes it an interesting and relevant topic for academic research; also their so-
cial and cultural influence is notable. The stars grow to become opinion leaders with 
considerable influence on public opinion and cultural development. 
Different names are used to describe online stardom. In the media and in non-aca-
demic fields these stars are mostly called influencers. This refers mainly to promo-
tional aspects of the star phenomenon, which is why this term is often found in a 
marketing context along with the description celebrity endorser (Jin & Phua 2014, 
Veirman et al. 2017, Xiao et al. 2018). In communication and media studies, they are 
often referred to as micro-celebrities (Senft 2008, Marwick 2010, 2015). The plat-
forms (inter alia, YouTube and Instagram) call them creators, as they create contents 
for their audience. In our research, we use the term social media stars because it is a 
neutral and comprehensive description of the phenomenon, covering all aspects of 
the star personality without putting too much weight on marketing, influencing or 
manipulative characteristics that some (but not all) social media stars are defined by. 
The term social media stars solely describes stardom that arises on social media plat-
forms. These platforms have different characteristics and services. As stardom arises 
with the provision of content, we focus on so-called content communities (inter alia, 
YouTube for videos, Instagram for pictures and Twitter for text content) rather than 
4 
 
so-called communication and networking communities (for instance, Facebook or 
LinkedIn).1  
Table 1 shows the most popular platforms and number of social media stars in rela-
tion. A complete and detailed overview of the most popular content communities 
for videos, pictures and text/blogging-contents (including information on revenues, 
number of content uploads, number of users, and superstar categories) is provided 
in the appendix (see Table 4). 
 
Table 1: Overview Platforms and Number of Social Media Stars 
Platform Parent Company Number of Top Stars2 
YouTube Google LLC Total: 46 
Vimeo InterActiveCorp Total: 0 
Twitch Amazon.com, Inc.  
(Twitch Interactive, Inc.) 
Total: 2 
MySpace Time Inc.  Total: 1 
Instagram Facebook Inc. Total: 13 
Pinterest Cold Brew Labs, Inc. Total: 1 
Twitter Twitter Inc. Total: 4 
Tumblr Oath Inc. 
(Until 2017: Yahoo) 
Total: 0 
Castillo (2018), Chatterjee & Aripaka (2018), Honsel (2018), Vimeo (2018), Winkler (2015), 
Wuttig (2018) 
 
Table 1 demonstrates, the leading platforms for social media usage and fame are 
YouTube and Instagram. Therefore, for illustrative purposes, we focus on these most 
popular ones for the present analysis – a choice that, however, should not exclude 
the possibility of emerging new platforms and changes in the market structure in the 
future. Although research on blogging and text communities might also reveal inter-
esting insights, it is the audio-visual content on social media sites that is a decisive 
                                                            
1  See Kaplan & Haenlein (2010) and Detel (2017: 119) for further differentiation between social 
media platforms. 
2  According to Forbes (2018) top ten rankings per category, excluding pets, private blogs and vlogs. 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
factor in creating the most predominant social media stars. This is why we exclude 
blogging and text communities from our analysis. 
Furthermore, different kinds of popular stars and accounts have to be distinguished. 
Firstly, social media stars (in the narrow sense) are content providers whose “fame is 
native to social media” (Marwick 2015: 337). This excludes star personalities like mu-
sicians, actors or athletes, who gained their prominence outside of the social media 
system, but also run successful social media accounts. Secondly, viral contents (like 
one-hit wonders) are excluded. The star character in our research is connected to the 
person operating the social media account. Content without personal connection, 
such as popular animal videos, trailers or individual viral videos, are not included in 
our research, along with non-commercial accounts or contents, private blogs or web-
sites. We analyse sustainable content providers with considerable star success, who 
evolve to become superstars in their social media category and are not primarily pre-
sent in the traditional offline world (e.g. gaming stars, fitness stars, how-to stars). 
Therefore, not the early stages of audience creation and attention seeking are the 
main focus of this paper, but the final steps of professionalisation from stardom to 
superstardom. 
The social media star phenomenon draws a lot of attention and is widely discussed 
in media and society. On the one hand, its novelty and, in particular, its great influ-
ence on consumers are emphasised (Nouri 2018), significantly departing from the 
traditional, “offline” superstar phenomenon as described by, for instance, Rosen 
(1981) and Adler (1985). On the other hand, Budzinski & Gaenssle (2018) find sup-
port for traditional economic superstar theories in their empirical analysis of 
YouTube-stars. This begs the question: does social media stardom represent a novel 
phenomenon with respect to its economic mechanisms or is it rather characterised 
by new light shining through old windows? In this paper, we address this research 
question by conceptually analysing traditional and potentially novel elements of the 
superstar phenomenon. In doing so, we identify a number of areas where social me-
dia stars resemble the traditional superstar phenomenon from an economic perspec-
tive (see chapters 2.1, 2.3, 2.4). Nevertheless, we also derive a number of star mech-
anisms that considerably depart from traditional theory like algorithm management 
and upload behaviour strategies (see chapters 3.2, 3.4). We disenchant major parts 
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of the “influencer-uniqueness”, as some developments seem different and novel, but 
the underlying mechanisms stay de facto the same, for instance, the changing role 
of gatekeepers, strategic intimacy and authenticity, and star-fan interaction (see 
chapters 3.3, 3.5). Eventually, we shed light on some popular buzzwords like user 
generated content or prosumers.  
The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, Section 2 reviews relevant aspects of the 
classic economic theory on superstars. Secondly, Section 3 outlines extensions to 
this theory, which are not subject to the previous economic analysis on superstars 
but instead represent novel aspects of the digital world of social media stars like 
algorithm management or upload behaviour. Section 4 provides some concluding 
thoughts.  
 
2. Classic Superstar Factors 
2.1 The Role of Talent 
The paper “The Economics of Superstars” by Rosen (1981) is the groundwork for the 
modern economic theory of superstars and identifies a fundamental aspect of star-
dom: small differences in talent generate significant and over-proportional differ-
ences in income. “Lesser talent is often a poor substitute for greater talent” (Rosen 
1981: 846). A sum of various mediocre performances does not add up to one out-
standing performance. Thus, the imperfect substitution of different levels of talent 
drives superstar effects.  
In theory this aspect makes up a core element of superstar power; however, objective 
measures of talent, which can be defined in so many different ways, have proven to 
be challenging in empirical studies (Krueger 2005, Franck & Nüesch 2012). What 
characterises “real” talent? What kind of talent is necessary to succeed in a market? 
Different sciences have different understandings of talent, e.g. sports sciences differ-
entiate the innate talent of an individual from the skills and proficiency that can be 
acquired and developed by training. The combination of both yields the performance 
of an athlete. Since measuring performance in many sports disciplines is possible (as, 
for instance, the speed of a sprinter) and despite the difficulties in disentangling 
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talent and skills, most talent-related empirical studies on superstars relate to sports 
(inter alia, Kahn 2000, Rosen & Sanderson 2001, Romer 2006).3 
However, the evaluation of the performance of entertainment stars is more complex 
(Schulze 2003, Franck & Nüesch 2012) and a distinction of talent and skills appears 
to be neither helpful nor feasible. Hamlen (1991), one of the few studies attempting 
to measure talent in entertainment media, measures the “harmonic quality” of a 
singer’s voice according to music science as a proxy for talent and analyses its influ-
ence on charts success. He finds that record sales under-proportionally increase with 
harmonic voice quality. However, the importance of the subjective perception of a 
performance by the audience (i.e. they feel entertained) as well as the inability of the 
audience to recognise “true” talent (Franck & Nüesch 2007) casts doubt on whether 
externally-measured talent really matters. As a consequence, Gergaud et al. (2012) 
analyse the influence of perceived talent, intelligence and beauty according to a sur-
vey of 49 celebrities from different categories of entertainment industries. They find 
that perceived talent and perceived intelligence are more important than perceived 
beauty. Budzinski et al. (2019) disentangle different dimensions of entertainment 
talent in popular music, including externally-measurable dimensions from music sci-
ence (like the composition scheme, instrumentation or the length of the intro) and 
subjective audience impressions (like charisma, softness, image, originality or inten-
sity). Somewhat generalised, they find that subjective dimensions are more relevant 
to success than objective ones. Therefore, in entertainment markets, the core talent 
in a particular field in combination with “soft-skills” (like pleasant appearance and 
charm) work together and influence the subjective perception of consumers. Accord-
ing to Amegashie (2009), this multidimensional character of competition in enter-
tainment markets actually fuels the utilisation of talent through effort. 
Similarly, there is not just one specific talent that can be pointed to concerning social 
media stars. Instead, most of them are entertainers and, therefore, subject to many 
facets attributable to an entertainment talent. Gaming stars (so called e-sports) may 
                                                            
3  However, measuring individual performance in team sports is more difficult: does the number of 
goals of a striker in (European-style) football, for instance, measures his performance (and talent) 
or the one of his team and/or the centres with their passes? 
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represent an exception; here, a measurement of playing talent (proxied by perfor-
mance) may be possible. Like in traditional sports, this type of talent may play a 
relevant role in the superstardom of gamers. Summing up, social media talent is a 
multidimensional entertainment talent, which is very difficult to exactly specify and 
delimit for empirical analyses. 
 
2.2 Superstar versus Celebrity? 
In contrast to “truly” talented stars, celebrities appear to be important, but, in fact, 
their fame quickly fades after they are hyped by the media. “The celebrity is a person 
who is known for his well-knownness” (Boorstin 1961: 57). Franck & Nüesch (2007) 
distinguish self-made superstars (à la Rosen 1981, Adler 1985, 2006, MacDon-
ald 1988, Borghans & Groot 1998) from manufactured celebrities (à la Boorstin 
1961, Gamson 1994, Marshall 1997, Cowen 2000, Turner 2004). According to their 
theory, superstars are unique personalities with extraordinary talent who excel in 
their respective fields. The imperfect substitution of superior talent makes them 
unique and distinctive, which gives them bargaining power (Rosen 1981, Borghans 
& Groot 1998). Celebrities, in contrast, are made and hyped by the media and are 
interchangeable; thus, they are dependent on media and do not enjoy considerable 
bargaining power. There is no specific quality attached to celebrities, who mainly 
fulfil entertainment purposes and are de facto insubstantial.  
In reality, however, the difference between superstars and celebrities is not that pre-
cise and the ostensible strict boundaries are rather blurred. A successful athlete might 
also be hyped by the media and reported on concerning his or her private life, 
whereas a celebrity might also have some talent and success in the long run.  
This is what we also find in the social media market. For instance, Marwick (2010, 
2015) refers to social media stars as micro-celebrities. “The micro-celebrity practi-
tioner may have a very small number of followers, but is able to inhabit the celebrity 
subject position through the use of […] social technologies […]” (Marwick 2015: 
334). In recent years, the social media market developed quickly and, for instance, a 
fan base of 1.1 billion subscribers to gaming accounts on YouTube (top 225 ac-
counts; Socialblade 2018) can hardly be described as “micro”. Nowadays, social me-
dia stars have a broad reach and operate on global online platforms. Thus, they have 
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outgrown the definition of “micro”, which might have been applicable in the begin-
nings of social media fame.  
Furthermore, due to the self-made characteristics of social media stars, the term “ce-
lebrity” in its above sketched meaning does not seem to be suitable for social media 
stars. Virtually all of the current top social media stars did not enjoy instant fame. 
Quite the contrary, they needed to generate an audience step-by-step in the early 
stages of their career. To compete in this information-rich market where switching 
and sampling costs are low and alternative contents “just a click away”, they needed 
to seriously invest into audience building (Budzinski & Gaenssle 2018) in order to 
slowly grow into star status. So, on the one hand, the paths towards success of most 
social media stars rather resemble the self-made superstar type than the celebrity 
type. On the other hand, referring to the media-made character of celebrities, it can 
be observed that social media platforms increasingly engage in active star building. 
Hence, (at least some) social media stars might be “media-made” in the sense of 
“platform-made” (see also chapter 3.5 on gatekeepers) – and this may become more 
relevant in the future. Overall, a sharp distinction between self-made superstars and 
manufactured celebrities does not appear to be particularly helpful for analysing so-
cial media stars.  
 
2.3 Economies of Scale and Market Power 
According to Rosen (1981) another factor, technology, is vital for explaining the mar-
ket concentration on only the most talented superstars. Typically, high first copy 
costs of media production are followed by low variable cost of distribution. For dig-
ital goods, the cost of reproduction is close to zero – without any notable loss of 
quality. There is no rivalry in consumption of media content, as it does not get used 
up by other consumers (Budzinski & Kuchinke 2019). “The implied scale economy of 
joint consumption allows relatively few sellers to service the entire market” (Rosen 
1981: 847). Nowadays, media contents are just “one click away” and can easily be 
purchased online. Following Rosen’s arguments, for the most talented (social media) 
star the effort of serving 100 or 100,000 recipients is more or less the same (Rosen 
1981: 847). The fixed cost of content generation, e.g. the production of a YouTube 
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video or an Instagram picture, is largely independent of the audience size.4 Moreo-
ver, contents can be spread over various platforms to increase reach. An Instagram 
picture or video with text, for instance, can also be posted on Twitter.  
It can be observed that many social media stars engage in such a multi-homing strat-
egies and operate diverse accounts. The larger the respective audience becomes, the 
more lucrative the production of content becomes. “The important practical impli-
cation is that it is monetarily advantageous to operate in a large overall market; and 
it is increasingly advantageous the more talented one is” (Rosen 1981: 855). Accord-
ing to Borghans & Groot (1998), the market size in combination with the market 
power of unique, non-exchangeable superstars leads to temporary monopolistic 
power. They argue that, due to the technology and scale effects, only one person is 
needed to serve the whole market and, thus, the concentration will be on the one 
with the best performance. In markets with homogeneous goods this could, in fact, 
lead to the “winner takes it all phenomenon” (Frank & Cook 2013).  
However, in media markets with heterogeneous goods, multi-homing and demand 
for diversity, this extreme development cannot be expected. Heterogeneous con-
sumer preferences and variety seeking behaviour delimit superstar power. What we 
actually observe is usually not one single superstar, who controls the market from a 
monopoly position, but a market concentration on a few top stars accompanied by 
numbers of medium stars. There are a lot more than just one or two famous rock 
bands, actresses or YouTube-stars (Schulze 2003). Typically, consumers listen to dif-
ferent bands of the same music genre for instance, and prefer some variety in their 
social media feeds. Hence, the market structure resembles a close oligopoly of a small 
number of powerful superstars (accompanied by a lot of less powerful stars who are 
still not completely irrelevant to the market), rather than a monopoly structure of 
one dominant superstar. 
                                                            
4  However, if star-fan interaction is important, the cost of communication and interaction increases 
with output quantities (audience size) (see chapter 3.5). 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Subscriptions to YouTube Gaming 
Socialblade (2018) 
 
Social media stars and the markets they are acting in do not substantially differ from 
traditional entertainment markets in this regard. Figure 1 visualises the superstar 
phenomenon and the concentration on the few most popular stars in the Gaming 
sector of YouTube (top 225 accounts, September 2018). It can be observed that the 
top stars gather a great majority of subscribers. The popularity rapidly decreases and 
then the decline-rate becomes rather constant after approximately rank 30. The given 
technology allows all content-providers to serve a global overall market with hetero-
geneous goods. Furthermore, scale effects in social media markets can also be re-
lated to accounts and not only to single content items (like a single video or picture). 
When accounts as serial publishers of contents from the same social media star are 
considered, overall economies of scale are comparatively weakened due to the ne-
cessity to constantly upload new content (see also section 3.4). Notwithstanding, the 
top group prevails despite numerous competitive contents in the (information-rich) 
social media environment. This shows the superstar character, as described by Rosen, 
in the modern social media market of YouTube and its inherent tendency towards 
few most favoured stars. 
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2.4 Experience Goods and Risk Aversion  
MacDonald (1988) developed a dynamic superstar model, which emphasises the role 
of former success as an explanation for current popularity. Risk-averse consumers 
prefer known qualities (incumbent stars) over unknown qualities (newcomers) and, 
thus, tend to stick with the incumbent market players they already know. Consumers 
can only evaluate the quality of an entertainment good after consumption due to its 
experience good characteristic. The combination of risk aversion and experience 
good characteristics leads to entry barriers for newcomers, who will find it difficult 
to draw the attention of consumers away from established and known stars.  
Applying MacDonald’s theory to the social media market implies that incumbents on 
a platform enjoy advantages over newcomers. Their previous success positively influ-
ences their current and future success. Empirical studies of YouTube show that the 
duration in the market is a vital aspect of social media success and YouTube stars of 
previous periods can maintain their top positions over time (Budzinski & Gaenssle 
2018). So, the path-dependencies of rising stars due to the conservatism of consum-
ers is observable in social media markets as well – despite their young age and still 
strongly expanding character. 
 
2.5 Consumption Capital and Network Effects  
Next to talent and former success, the popularity and public status of a star may be 
a factor of success, according to Adler (1985). In his paper, he expands Rosen’s model 
referring to the specific knowledge of consumers and the accumulation of consump-
tion capital (Stigler & Becker 1977). The more consumers know about a star and his 
or her work, the more enjoyment they can derive from further consumption. For 
instance, previous knowledge of a specific video game makes it easier to follow a 
gaming star playing it. Adler emphasises three ways to accumulate star-specific 
knowledge: (i) the direct consumption of his or her work (Stigler & Becker 1977), 
(ii) discussion about it with friends and acquaintances, including gossip (common-
ality effects), (iii) information through media coverage (Adler 2006). The only cost 
for consumers is the time they spend for direct consumption (if consumption is free 
of charge) and searching costs to find information about the star and conversation 
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partners. Following the most famous and popular star minimises these costs, as he 
or she is widely known and information is broadly available. “When the artist is pop-
ular, it is easier to find discussants who are familiar with her or to find media cover-
age about her. This is why consumers prefer to consume what others also consume” 
(Adler 2006: 898). Since consumers prefer the same star and maximise their marginal 
utility, this results in positive direct network effects and bandwagon effects (Leiben-
stein 1950). Regarding the high volume and low cost of communication in social 
media, bandwagon effects are likely to occur. In gaming, for instance, fans of a spe-
cific video game can teach each other tricks and necessary skills or discuss technical 
features and updates. This naturally results in the accumulation of consumption cap-
ital and knowledge. Enthusiasts tend to gather around the most famous stars (see 
Figure 1), who not only provide high quality information/content due to superior 
talent (Rosen-perspective) but unify people with similar interests (Adler-perspective). 
It is easy to find like-minded people, who comment on posts or during live-videos of 
their favourite star. Thus, fans can increase their knowledge using fan-fan interac-
tion.5  
This cohesion can be fuelled by the social media stars, who skilfully use platform 
features such as hashtags, 6 e.g. on Instagram or Twitter. Some stars create their own 
keywords to mark their personal content. These individual hashtags are later not only 
used by the star himself or herself but also among fans, thus, making it possible for 
others to easily find the related content. Fitness stars on Instagram, for instance, use 
specific hashtags for their fitness programmes, which subsequently unites all partic-
ipants following their fitness schedule (and posting tagged content). As every mem-
ber has to complete the same workouts, the experience of others is helpful and sup-
portive. The more like-minded athletes become available, the more utility every single 
person can derive from the network. Hence, these hashtags connect all fans, leading 
to strong direct network effects. 
                                                            
5  For star-fan interaction see chapter 0. 
6  Hashtags are keywords or catchwords used in social media, which are created by placing the sign 
“#” directly in front of it. These words are intended to convey the key message of the content and 
simplify the possibility to find the respective content (and similar posts). 
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Moreover, in social media the positive direct network effects are not only one-dimen-
sional but may be two-dimensional: online and offline. As described above, direct 
network effects arise on social media platforms and online communities evolve. The 
bigger the network, the better the chances of finding interesting conversation part-
ners. However, in addition, fans who meet online may transfer the connection to 
offline relationships (similar to online-dating). Continuing the fitness example, par-
ticipants of a workout programme first connect online via the star’s pages and then 
might be able to find a partner to actually practise with offline. The chances to find 
a suitable partner (of the same fitness level, for example) in a geographically limited 
area are much higher, if one follows the biggest and most famous stars.  
Summing up, it can be said that the effects assumed by Adler can also be found in 
social media markets and the nature of the market even increases network effects. 
The digital environment simplifies communication, decreases the cost to reach a 
huge audience and network effects multiply more rapidly than in offline markets. 
 
2.6 Summary: The Role of the Old Windows 
Altogether, the idea that superstardom in social media represents a completely new 
phenomenon and “traditional” superstar theories lose their explanatory power in this 
new media environment must be rejected. The role of talent is very similar to tradi-
tional markets – including similarities between sports and e-sports. Furthermore, the 
typical market concentration effects (see Figure 1), which are constitutional for the 
traditional economic theory of superstars, are also present in social media markets. 
Moreover, both MacDonald-style effects and Adler-style effects – both describing the 
dynamics of superstar markets – belong to the fundamental mechanisms of social 
media stardom. Initial empirical evidence supports this conceptual and theoretical 
assessment (Budzinski & Gaenssle 2018). The distinction between self-made super-
stars and manufactured celebrities does not appear to be helpful in social media 
markets (as it is now) – and may also be questioned for traditional markets. 
So, is there nothing new under the sun? First, it needs to be noted that the effects 
and mechanisms described by the traditional theory partly come in a new disguise in 
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social media, which, for instance, for Adler-style effects implies an increasing rele-
vance because of stronger and more radical mechanisms. Second, a continuing rele-
vance of traditional theoretical concepts of superstardom do not necessarily exclude 
the emergence of additional new factors. The following chapter discusses such new 
factors as they are brought up in the literature and in public discussion. We shed 
light on whether they actually represent novel factors that are exclusive to social 
media. 
 
3. New Factors in Social Media 
3.1 User Generated Content, Prosumption, and Platform Economics 
In the existing literature on social media and related stars, in particular two phenom-
ena with a view to economics, are discussed as new features: user-generated content 
and prosumption (inter alia, Kaplan & Haenlein 2010, Ritzer & Jurgenson 2010, Denn-
hardt 2014, Fuchs 2014, Morreale 2014, Detel 2017; sometimes also produsage, e.g. 
Bruns 2008).  
Even though the majority of the literature discussing these ostensibly new features 
is not from within economics, it draws important conclusions for economics, i.e. fun-
damental concepts of microeconomics are declared to be outdated and in need of 
being replaced by these two new concepts. In this section, we take a critical look on 
(i) what these new concepts actually contain and (ii) whether they are suitable to 
replace standard economic thinking. 
The term user-generated content (UGC) “is usually applied to describe the various 
forms of media content that are publicly available and created by end-users” (Kaplan 
and Haenlein 2010: 61). It is often defined by three characteristics (inter alia, OECD 
2007, Kaplan & Haenlein 2010):  
(1) UGC is any content published on a website or on a social network site acces-
sible to the public or at least to a selected group of people. This condition 
excludes, for instance, content exchanged via emails or messengers. 
(2) The content needs to entail a creative effort, excluding mere replications of 
already existing content. 
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(3) UGC must have been created outside of professional routines and practices, 
excluding all content that has been created with a commercial market context 
in mind. 
For our purposes, the third precondition is particularly relevant. Given the multibil-
lion-dollar nature of the business, content provided by social media stars is clearly 
not created outside of professional entertainment business and commercial market 
context. In contrast, it represents a highly commercial endeavour, both from the 
sides of the content providers and from the side of the social media platforms. Con-
sequently, the term UGC – following this definition – does not apply to social media 
stars.  
In a broader definition, UGC could simply refer to content provided by users of a 
given platform, irrespective of commercial purpose or character. However, all con-
tent on social media platforms is user-generated since it is impossible to upload con-
tent without being a platform user. Consequently, we can then simplify and just use 
the term content.  
However, the quote by Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) additionally refers to another 
interesting economic dimension in the discussion: they refer to content created by 
end-users, i.e. consumers. The idea that users are simultaneously producers and con-
sumers of content has led to the introduction of the term “prosumption, a term that 
describes the implosion of production and consumption that characterises Web 2.0” 
(Morreale 2014: 114). The original literature on prosumption focuses on the increas-
ing division of labour in the course of the so-called Industrial Revolution, which al-
legedly “separated production and consumption, but […] also contends that even at 
the height of the Industrial Revolution production and consumption were never fully 
distinct (producers consumed raw materials; consumers produced their meals) […]. 
This false binary is rejected […]” (Ritzer & Jurgenson 2010: 17). The “contemporary 
society is moving away from the aberrant separation of production and consumption 
and towards a ‘third wave’ that, in part, signals their reintegration in ‘the rise of the 
prosumer’ (Toffler, 1980: 265)” (Ritzer & Jurgenson 2010: 17). Often in combination 
with UGC, the concept of prosumption enjoys considerable popularity among au-
thors discussing social media content and its economic dimensions, including the 
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phenomenon of social media stars (inter alia, Dennhardt 2014, Fuchs 2014, Morre-
ale 2014, Grabs & Bannour 2016). 
However, from an economics perspective, there seems to be a misunderstanding. 
The terms producer and consumer describe the economic roles of production and 
consumption and are not attached to single persons who either do one or the other 
all of their time or in their whole life. Every individual acting as a producer is and has 
always been acting as a consumer as well – in a different and usually separable eco-
nomic role. Of course, a food producer (i.e. a farmer) or a supermarket owner will 
also consume food. Still, the two roles are distinct: either he or she acts in a specific 
situation as a producer (i.e. producing, retailing or selling food) or as a consumer 
(i.e. consuming food or buying it for consumption). Both actions are usually sepa-
rated by time and, even if not, can always be separated analytically. This logic also 
applies to content providers in social media: the same person either acts in a specific 
situation as a producer (i.e. producing a video or a picture and/or uploading it to 
YouTube, Instagram and co.) or as a consumer (i.e. watching a social media video or 
picture). Thus, there is neither an “implosion” of production and consumption,7 nor 
are these standard economic concepts becoming obsolete in the modern internet 
economy.8 Both approaches, prosumption and UGC, seem to be intuitively fitting 
due to the personal nature of some social media content and the possibility of non-
commercial provision of those. Private or even intimate information can be published 
by any platform member. Still, in the economic sense even non-professional, non-
commercial content providers are producers in the moment of provision/posting (see 
Figure 2). So, it actually does not even matter, whether the production of contents 
is commercial (as in the case of social media stars) or not (as in the widespread shar-
ing of family or pet videos). In summary, talking about UGC and prosumption does 
not add any insight to the analysis of social media stars and is inadequate from an 
                                                            
7  Ritzer and Jurgenson (2010) depart from standard economic understanding, when they claim that 
(i) “producers consumed raw materials” and (ii) “consumers produced their meals”. In (i) producers 
are customers exerting a demand for upstream goods but not consumers (= end-users) and in 
(ii) someone cooking his or her own meal indeed acts as (non-commercial) producer while cooking 
and as a consumer while eating. Even if he or she already eats while cooking, the two actions can 
analytically be separated, which is useful because of the differing economic implications. 
8  A different question is whether there is a new importance or a new level of interaction between 
stars and their audience in social media (sometimes confusingly labelled co-creation). We discuss 
this question in section 3.6. 
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economic point of view. Like in the more traditional entertainment world, there are 
stars providing entertainment content (producers) and there are recipients consum-
ing this content (consumers).  
A related but different notion would be concepts of joint production, i.e. online ser-
vices and users co-produce a good with the user injecting its personalised data as an 
input to the production process. However, producers employing available infor-
mation about their customers to shape goods according to the so-perceived prefer-
ences represents an element of any competitive supply of goods. While the availabil-
ity of information from and about customers considerably increases in the online 
world, it remains an endeavour of suppliers seeking to match customer preferences 
rather than any type of co-production. While data-driven business models – which 
are discussed more in detail in section 3.2 – indeed significantly shape the commer-
cial environment of social media stars, they do not require any productive or creative 
activity from users, just standard consumption behaviour. Similarly, communicative 
star-fan interaction may influence online stardom (see section 3.5) but merely pro-
vides additional information channels about consumer preferences rather than asso-
ciating a producer role with video (YouTube) or picture (Instagram) watching and 
commenting.  
The business model of the currently prominent social media platforms, however, 
does resemble what modern economics describe as platforms (inter alia; Rochet & 
Tirole 2003, 2006, Armstrong 2006, Anderson & Gabszewicz 2006, Haucap & 
Stühmeier 2016, Budzinski & Kuchinke 2019). Social media platforms as suppliers 
serve three different customer groups: (i) content providers (commercially and non-
commercially) demanding space for and access to their contents, (ii) content users 
consuming these contents, and (iii) advertisers demanding the attention of content 
users for the advertised goods.9 Through targeted advertising, the platform places 
the ads in a way as to maximise advertising revenues. On platforms with ad share 
policies, like YouTube and Twitch, commercial content providers receive a share of 
the advertising revenues created by ads placed/shown in the context of their content 
                                                            
9  These platforms can be characterised as artificial platforms. A business model based on subscrip-
tion fees would also be possible, but is not chosen, presumably to attract users and initiate network 
effects. 
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from the platforms (marked as dotted arrow in Figure 2). Some social media stars 
also directly place advertising in their contents (product placement) or cooperate 
with companies and are directly paid for this cooperation. This is the actual influencer 
part of social media stars, which can predominantly be found on platforms like In-
stagram or Twitter, where stars are not integrated into the platform-immanent ad-
vertising system. Next to direct network effects à la Adler (see section 2.5), this busi-
ness model manages indirect network externalities (INE) in a commercial way (see 
Figure 2). These INE are economies of size on the demand side and describe that an 
increase in the quantity of content providers increases the utility for content con-
sumers and vice versa. Similarly, an increase in the number of content consumers 
(overall or from specific target groups) increases the utility of advertisers. However, 
while these are all positive INE, it is rather unclear whether an increase in advertising 
will increase the utility or the disutility of content consumers (e.g. increasing their 
advertising avoidance costs) and, thus, whether this specific INE may be negative. 
 
Figure 2: Multisided Social Media Platform  
 
Modified and enhanced from Dewenter & Rösch (2015) 
 
The implications of platform economics relate particularly to the market structure of 
the platform market. Due to the INE, this market will be concentrated on a few big 
platforms with considerable market positions. In tendency, this weakens the market 
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power of superstars (as described in the traditional theory, see section 2.3) compared 
to more fragmented media industries that traditional stars often used to face.   
 
3.2 Algorithm Management 
The increase of available information (so-called big data) drives the importance of 
algorithms.10 Content-specific platforms like YouTube or Instagram use algorithms 
to collect and analyse consumer data. This personalised data11 is used for, firstly, 
targeted advertising, which means that consumers “pay” with the provision of their 
personal information (see platform economics in section 3.1) to subsequently receive 
individually customised advertising. Advertisers are, thus, willing to pay higher prices 
for more effective advertising to reach their specific target group.  
Secondly, the provided data is used for tailor-made recommendations of contents as 
well as search results within the platform. Based upon the consumers’ individual his-
toric behaviour and preferences, so-called personalised recommender systems and 
personalised search engines create an individual compilation of contents (inter alia, 
Belleflamme & Peitz 2018, Budzinski & Lindstädt-Dreusicke 2018). Although, the de-
tails of the algorithms generally remain business secrets of the platforms and are 
changed/adjusted frequently (Budzinski & Kuchinke 2019), different aspects are 
known to have an influence on content recommendation: inter alia, the content 
“age” since upload, the total number of views and likes of the content in question 
as well as the audience size of the uploader (Borghol et al. 2012). From an economic 
point of view, the individualised selection of content recommendations and search 
rankings is thus based on both stated preferences (likes, comments, tags or posts) 
and revealed preferences (actual viewing history, consumption time, search com-
mands, etc.) by the users (Budzinski & Kuchinke 2019). Thus, it delivers the user who 
types in a search term with an individualised results ranking that follows his or her 
                                                            
10  Different aspects on algorithms can be found in scientific literature. On the demand side, digital 
personal assistants (Budzinski et al. 2018), algorithmic consumers (Gal & Elkin-Koren 2017) and 
bots (software robots, which are designed to exhibit human-like behaviour) (Ferrara 2015, Ferrara 
et al. 2016) can be named. On the supply side, price-setting algorithms raised concerns of novel 
competition problems and collusive behaviour among competitors (Ezrachi & Stucke 2015, 2016a, 
2016b, 2017, Mehra 2015, Pasquale 2016, Oxera 2017, Woodcock 2017, Schwalbe 2018).  
11 On data-based services, personalised data and privacy also see: Acquisti & Varian 2005, Acquisti 
et al. 2016, Brown 2016, Budzinski & Kuchinke 2019, Budzinski & Stöhr 2018. 
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preferences so that the probability increases that the user quickly finds what he or 
she is searching for. Furthermore, each user receives – unrequested – an individual-
ised ranking of content recommendations again increasing the probability that the 
recommended content is interesting for the user. Both algorithm-based services en-
hance the probability that users consume more contents (thus stay longer within the 
platform) and visit the platform more frequently since these services – together with 
low sampling costs – reduce information uncertainty of consumers, i.e. represent 
(imperfect) information about content quality in the eyes of the users. 
Every social media platform has specific and individualised recommendation sites 
and overview pages and they distinguish (data-based) online media from virtually all 
traditional media. Furthermore, these algorithm-based services influence superstar 
mechanisms in different ways. In the multisided market of social media, different 
players experience different incentives how to deal with or use the underlying algo-
rithm. In the following, (i) the content providers and (ii) the operator of the algo-
rithm, the platform itself, are analysed with respect to the superstar phenomenon.  
 
(i) Content Provider Perspective 
Content providers need specific knowledge of the respective platform and its algo-
rithm to successfully place posts and manage contents. Like with other data-based 
services, users’ consumption choices heavily depend on the content that is presented 
prominently (i) in the search results and (ii) in recommendations individualised-dis-
played for these users. Many consumers tend to choose among the top-listed search 
results in prominent position (Ghose & Yang 2009) and follow top-listed recommen-
dations. While the ranking of search results and recommendations is considerably 
based upon individual personalised data (stated and revealed preferences like the 
individual consumption history, etc.), even the potentially matching content would 
be too much to adequately reduce the information overflow problem of the con-
sumer. Thus, additional criteria for algorithmic selection and ranking seek to further 
enhance the probability of extended consumption. Understanding or anticipating 
the working properties of the algorithmic selection means for content providers that 
the probability of being prominently displayed in search and recommendation results 
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may be strategically increased – something which is imminently important in order 
to reach audience and avoid to be disappearing in information overflow (i.e. being 
downlisted to the second, third, etc. pages of search results and recommendation 
items).  
Being prominently listed is paramount for success in the social media world as even 
the best content will not find any relevant audience without being pre-selected by 
the algorithm-based search and recommendation services. With the help of ad-
vanced linking-logic, as e.g. the usage of keywords, cross-referencing and network-
ing,12 single posts can be pushed and spread. The art of adapting contents to the 
specific algorithms can be refined through experience. Sophisticated market players, 
like social media stars or their agencies and multichannel networks (see section 3.3), 
continuously learn and improve their algorithm management skills and built up com-
petences. Experienced incumbents can, thus, iteratively improve their system and 
outdo amateurs so that consumers easily find their content highly-placed in the re-
spective recommendations (Budzinski & Gaenssle 2018). These learning effects lead 
to advantages for professionals and incumbents, which can increase barriers to entry 
for newcomers.  
The specific selection of contents by the platform’s algorithm-based search and rec-
ommendation services pushes certain contents and increases their reach and popu-
larity. So within the massive content provision some particular posts are chosen for 
recommendations, automated playbacks, explore sites, etc. and, thus, pushed and 
supported to get even more attention. If an uploader is able to play the algorithm 
and successfully manages the recommendation system, it will increase the posts’ 
reach and fuel snowball effects.  
Eventually, algorithm management matters as a core factor of social media success. 
Due to the frequent evolution of the algorithms by the platforms, algorithm man-
agement is always imperfect and remains a permanent challenge for social media 
stars. 
 
                                                            
12  Cross-referencing and networking means linking other social media stars in the content, generat-
ing joint content or being featured on other social media accounts. 
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(ii) Platform Perspective 
Platforms like YouTube or Instagram are sometimes perceived as offering a “neutral” 
space for content providers to fight for the attention of the audience on a level play-
ing field. However, profit-maximising platforms experience incentives to engage in 
strategic algorithm policy and to push and promote certain content and suggest it 
to respective target groups, in particular if they enjoy powerful or dominant market 
positions. With its algorithm-based recommendation service, the platform decreases 
search costs and information overload for consumers. The goal of this aggregation 
service is to simplify consumption and, in doing so, increase the total consumption 
on the platform. Managing its algorithm (which is the platform’s property), the plat-
form maximises its turnover and profits (Budzinski & Lindstädt-Dreusicke 2018).  
Obviously, the platform experiences incentives to manage its algorithm in a way that 
consumers get what they want, i.e. content according to their preferences. This im-
plies both the use of personalised user data in order to approximate the preferences 
of the user and the promotion of successful contents (with respect to similar con-
sumers/target groups) that have a high likelihood of being liked. While the star-mak-
ing effects of these two aspects are well-explored in the preceding sections, another 
incentive, however, points to an even more sophisticated selection process. Due to 
the information overflow character of available content and the consequent depend-
ence of users on the algorithmic pre-selection of the platforms, the latter gain scope 
for injecting profit-interests into their algorithm management which departs from 
strictly looking at consumers’ preferences: scope for a recommendation and search 
bias exists, especially in the case of market power by the platforms. 
Social media platforms experience incentives that involve creating their own stars 
(who may be easier to control) over further supporting the most successful stars with 
a lot of bargaining power (Franck & Nüesch 2007). Due to their extraordinary talent, 
superstars enjoy a certain degree of bargaining power (Rosen 1985, Borghans & 
Groot 1998), which allows them to acquire a considerable share of the rents that 
may be earned with their contents. Therefore, the platforms have an incentive to 
push content of hand-picked platform immanent stars, rather than deal with major 
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stars that have more bargaining power and might not easily accept restrictive con-
tracts or conditions. In this case, they may be able to acquire a larger share of the 
rents for the platform itself, at the expense of the content provider. In fact, platforms 
are indeed looking for potential newcomers, who are starving for attention and suc-
cess and are willing to invest in their social media career. The creator academy by 
YouTube is a good example for this phenomenon. YouTube operates this channel to 
educate content providers and share information from “YouTube experts” (YouTube 
2018b). Furthermore, platform-connected agencies are involved in creating new stars 
(see chapter 0), like, in the case of YouTube, so-called multichannel networks. They 
teach newcomers how to become stars, adding those to the network.  
By cooperating with those agencies, the platform creates and supports in-house stars 
and, thus, intensifies the competition among content providers. This strategically 
spreads the bargaining power among them and increases the economic dependence 
of content providers on the platform. Platforms may support this profit-maximising 
strategy by using their scope for recommendation biases and systematically favour 
their own, more dependent stars over more independent ones. Thus, platform algo-
rithm management has incentives to balance preference-conformal selection to 
please users with platform-partners-privileges selection to maximise profits. Hence, 
social media stars may not be in the traditional sense “media-made”, but, some may 
be “platform-made”. 
 
3.3 Changing Roles of Gatekeepers? 
The role of gatekeepers, i.e. those who control access to the audience in media mar-
kets, has always been a crucial issue. In traditional media markets, the access to the 
audience is often limited by editing processes of media companies. The latter and 
their editorial offices used to decide which contents are broadcasted, for instance in 
traditional TV, or printed, for instance in magazines, and, thus, played an important 
role in the generation of stars and for their further careers. Many authors from vari-
ous disciplines assume, however, that the social media world, by contrast, is charac-
terised by a large-scale shift towards integration and participation of the masses (in-
ter alia, Benkler 2006, Jenkins 2006, Bruns 2008, 2011, Bruns & Highfield 2012, 
Shirky 2008, 2011, Castells 2009, Jenkins et al. 2012). It is argued that “traditional 
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media have lost their institutional monopoly over the mass production and distribu-
tion of news, entertainment, and opinions” (Blank 2013: 591). Every member of a 
social media platform is principally able to publish content, giving the individual 
power to spread information among all members and making traditional editors, 
intermediary mediators or gatekeepers, who select and prioritise, obsolete in this 
process. 
In the literature, the implications are either hailed as a democratisation of content or 
“democratainment” (Hartley 1999, Bruns 2008, 2011, Bruns & Highfield 2012, Detel 
2017) or demonised as loss of content quality (Singer 2010), persuasive messages 
(Chang et al. 2015) or “cultural decay” (Molthagen-Schnörin 2017). 
The former reasoning shares a sceptical view of the power of (elitist) editorial offices 
in traditional media, whereas the latter one emphasises their quality-preserving ex-
pertise. In the following, we argue that none of these radical positions fit with the 
economic reality in social media markets and that the role of gatekeepers for stardom 
development has evolved rather than become obsolete. 
Even though there is a large content production and a lot of information available, 
there is only so much information the consumers are able to process.13 The consump-
tion capacities per unit of time are limited (scarcity of attention) (Simon 1971, Falk-
inger 2008). Attention on the consumer side is finite (as it has always been) and the 
provision of too much content leads to information overload situations. Therefore, 
the need for selection and prioritisation remains relevant: the average consumer has 
neither the time nor the resources to hand-pick individually interesting information 
out of all existing online content. This is why platforms use algorithmic recommender 
systems to pre-select content (also quality-wise) potentially fitting individual con-
sumer’s preferences (see chapter 0), thereby, dealing with the bottleneck of scarce 
attention. Consequently, platforms act as gatekeepers and are often described as 
“aggregators” of content (Detel 2017). Social media platforms are thus able to chan-
                                                            
13  On economics of attention markets also see: Evans (2013, 2017), Boik et al. (2017); and building 
on Becker (1965) see: Goolsbee & Klenow (2006), Brynjolfsson & Oh (2012). 
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nel (i.e. influence or even manipulate) the streams of attention, (at least partly) re-
placing former mediators and gatekeepers in the content production and star crea-
tion process – in particular if they enjoy market power.14  
Another potential gatekeeper in the social media market are managing agencies, for 
example, so-called multichannel networks (MCN) in the case of YouTube. These agen-
cies represent stars and engage in supporting services (e.g. support in production, 
distribution and marketing; cross promotion with other stars of the network; digital 
rights management; organisation of live events and merchandise; audience build-
ing). Figure 3 visualises an extract of the multisided social media market (as pictured 
in Figure 2, chapter 3.1) and adds the role of agencies within the system.  
 
Figure 3: Role of Agencies in the Multisided Social Media Market 
 
Modified and enhanced from Roß & Weghake (2015) 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
14  For instance, Google increased the requirements for monetarisation of YouTube accounts: “Once 
a channel reaches 4,000 watch hours in the previous 12 months and 1,000 subscribers it will be 
reviewed to join the program.” (Google 2018). 
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These agencies act as “silent power” behind the stars. Numerous top YouTube stars 
are under contract with large multichannel networks – without awareness of the 
audience.15 It can be argued that with the rising power of agencies it becomes a 
necessity to be under contract with one of the major agencies in order to be success-
ful, connected, and visible. The market experience in algorithm management, the 
integration into a substantial star network and the provision of equipment and 
knowledge can make a big difference for potential stars and newcomers.  
A closer view of the ownership structures reveals that the most relevant agencies are 
owned by big media companies that are well-known from traditional media markets 
and comprehensively integrated in the global media market (see Table 2). Most top 
MCNs belong to media conglomerates, which operate in various media fields (print, 
audio and audio-visual media). Consequently, upcoming and aspiring stars still face 
gatekeepers in order to gain access to a relevant audience. The players might have 
new names but the functionality, influence and ownership structures resemble the 
old model. While social media markets are still developing with various changes and 
fluctuation, it is already anticipatable that the role of gatekeepers is re-establishing 
itself. 
  
                                                            
15  In 2015, 70-80 percent of the top 100 channels in Germany cooperated with MCNs (Roß & 
Weghake 2015). Unfortunately, newer information is barely available. Socialblade, for instance, 
stopped providing information on MCNs since they now engage in YouTube consulting themselves. 
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Table 2: Top 15 Multichannel Networks 
MCN Parent Company Members Subscriber 
BroadbandTV  RTL Group, 
Bertelsmann 
238,649  78,457,936  
vevo  Universal/Sony 12,033  34,798,588  
AIR  AWARDS MEDIA GROUP 37,477  25,419,132  
Fullscreen Network  AT&T, WarnerMedia 68,250  24,428,549  
Yoola  - 43,579  22,696,094  
Studio71  ProSiebenSat.1 13,174  13,900,550  
ScaleLab  - 23,306  11,609,881  
Maker Studios/ 
Disney Digital Network 
Disney 9,419  10,270,788  
Yeah1 Network  Yeah1 Group 4,602  10,124,935  
Freedom!  * 103,345  9,221,166  
Believe *  71,835 8,817,765 
ONErpm - 21,874 8,509,317 
Union for Gamers Amazon 10,604 8,201,850 
theorchardmusic Sony Music 125,951 7,862,389 
Machinima AT&T, WarnerMedia 8,501 7,139,399 
22nd November 2017, 16 sorted by Subscriptions 
Socialblade (2017) 
 
3.4 Upload Behaviour and Specific Investment 
A relevant first step towards social media stardom is the content creation and provi-
sion on social media platforms. It evidently requires a minimum activity to gain pop-
ularity and followers, which means that content uploads positively influence success 
(as in growing numbers of views and subscribers). Yet, providing too much infor-
mation can reverse the effect and may have negative effects on further consumption. 
Budzinski and Gaenssle (2018) find empirical evidence with respect to YouTube that 
increasing uploads per time unit at first have positive influence on views and sub-
scribers (low level/few uploads). However, this effects flips with growing quantity of 
                                                            
16  Last available data collection of Socialblade, retrieved via Wayback Machine. 
 * Parent company is unknown 
 - Company is independent 
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uploads (high level/many uploads), resulting in a non-linear U-shape relation be-
tween uploads and success. See short-term (S) and long-term (L) effects in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: U-shape Relationship: Success and Upload 
 
Budzinski & Gaenssle (2018) 
 
This effect can be explained by (i) limited consumption capacities and/or (ii) limited 
production capacities: 
(i) Information overload on the consumer side (see chapters 3.2 and 3.3) can 
lead to attention withdrawal. Content providers need to offer sufficient 
content for information-hungry “heavy” users, while not providing too 
much information for attention-scarce ones. Too much content can get 
tiring and overstraining for average consumers, since it is either not possi-
ble to follow all of “your” star’s news or the mass of information and no-
tifications become annoying and tedious. This strongly depends on the 
cost of consumption; the time spent absorbing the respective information, 
which widely varies between different content categories (inter-category: 
e.g. video versus picture) and its complexity/length/context (intra-category: 
e.g. video clip vs. tutorial video, snapshot vs. artwork).  
(ii) The quality of the content is also crucial on provider side. A high frequency 
of uploads increases the pressure on creativity to constantly produce new 
ideas. Production time and technical standards must be kept to meet con-
sumers’ expectation and keep the quality at a certain level. Hence, it is 
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possible that the quality of the content decreases with high output; ex-
hausting the producer’s capacities and driving consumers away. 
Eventually, in order to succeed in the long run, content providers need to constantly 
upload a certain amount of content to attract attention and build an audience, while 
at the same time not overstraining them by (low-quality) volume. It is a narrow line 
between feeding interesting and entertaining information and spamming low-qual-
ity quantity. The optimal upload frequency varies with the type of content. For in-
stance, average consumption efforts are considerably lower for picture-platforms 
(like Instagram) than for video-platforms (like YouTube), which should influence op-
timal frequency as should the lower production costs of content in the former. To 
our best knowledge, however, no comparative empirical research exists here so far. 
Content providers and future social media stars need to heavily invest in audience 
building and maintenance by constantly generating and uploading new content. It 
is inevitable to create a solid content base in the beginning to convince potential 
consumers of the account’s quality. If the available content meets their preferences, 
they subscribe to the channel/account to receive future contents (experience good 
characteristics). A newcomer needs to draw attention and reach a critical mass to 
kick-start reinforcing effects à la Adler (see chapter 2.5). This requires specific invest-
ments in the beginning with little reward and audience feedback. Social media stars 
need to put hard work and comprehensive personal input into the creation of their 
stardom. The step from moderately successful content provider (medium star) to be-
coming an actual superstar requires perseverance and commitment. Like with all 
types of stars, the belief in yourself, your skills and capabilities must be strong 
enough to persevere in the face of negative feedback, setbacks, ignorance and 
doubts. The notion of hobby-style content uploaders, who accidentally tumble into 
stardom, does not reflect the typical contemporary reality of social media stars or at 
least not of the top end superstars (and the few exceptions usually date back to the 
earlier days of the platforms when the overflow of information was much more lim-
ited). Social media newcomers need high frustration tolerance and robustness to 
keep up quality uploads and succeed in the long run. This persistent and specific 
investment in audience building can represent a considerable market entry barrier 
for newcomers. 
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The relevance of both factors, specific investments in long-term audience building 
and strategic upload behaviour (a balancing act between too few and too high up-
load frequencies), essentially contributes to the success of social media stars. While 
this may resemble phenomena in traditional media – a too frequent appearance of 
an individual actor on TV may also overstrain/annoy the audience – social media stars 
can more directly manage their upload behaviour and media presence. Exaggerat-
edly, upload management is “feeding” tailor-made contents in right amounts to the 
respective (self-created) audience. This audience creation and long-term mainte-
nance crucially differentiates social media stars from stars of traditional channels. 
Thus, here is another factor where the influence of a star on his or her success is of 
a different quality than in the traditional world. 
 
3.5 Authenticity and Accessibility: Ordinary People as Stars and Fan-Star Interaction 
In the existing literature on social media stars, authenticity is often emphasised as an 
important success factor of this type of star (inter alia, Döring 2014, Marwick 2015, 
Audrezet et al. 2018, Burgess & Green 2018). It remains unclear, though, whether 
authenticity is meant to be a superstar-making factor within social media content 
providers, i.e. that a more authentic social media star is more successful than a less 
authentic one, or whether it is meant to explain the attractiveness and appeal of 
social media stars vis-à-vis stars from traditional media. For instance, a German study 
of YouTube stars by Google shows that, in contrast to TV, film, and music stars, 
YouTube stars are specifically valued among teenagers for their credibility, authen-
ticity and closeness/tangibility (Google 2016).17 This empirical result points more to 
authenticity being a success factor for social media stars in competition with tradi-
tional stars – and within a younger audience! We are not aware of any research 
attempting to measure the influence of authenticity on the competition among so-
cial media stars. 
                                                            
17  In the main part of the study, 700 German teenagers between 13 and 19 answered an online 
questionnaire with regard to different characteristics as, inter alia, role model function, authentic-
ity and credibility. 
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The narrative from the literature concerning why social media stars are perceived to 
be authentic, real and accessible consists of two fundamental aspects: (i) their “com-
monness” or “ordinariness” and (ii) the enhanced fan-star interaction. 
Starting with the first aspect, social media stars may firstly be seen as “ordinary” 
people who upload content on their (ostensibly private) accounts. Consumers may 
experience the star as “one of us”. The “shift from the elite to the ordinary” (Turner 
2006: 154), from distant stars to so-called “DIY celebrities” (Turner 2006, Burgess & 
Green 2018), may increase possible identification with the star. Sometimes social 
media stars actively engage in self-presentation by uploading (semi-)private content. 
This way they create a strategic intimacy to please their audience (Marwick 2015). 
Secondly, the ostensibly direct contact to fans without intermediate gatekeepers (like 
interviewers, reporters or publishers from traditional media) may decrease possible 
interferences and/or biases of retelling and editing (Detel 2017: 320), allowing the 
stars to share their pure, individual, and unfiltered view. An unbiased personal per-
spective of their star seems to be of great importance to many adolescent fans 
(Google 2016) and may enhance the impression of authenticity and closeness. 
Thirdly, a certain effect of satiation of the traditional (and superficial) glamour star 
world may play a role. Compared to some high-gloss marketing content of stars in 
traditional media, social media stars may seem to be closer to real life (of an average 
person in industrialised countries), which is strategically fuelled by behind the scenes 
pictures, interaction with the camera and/or self-presentation in allegedly private or 
vulnerable situations, e.g. without makeup.  
However, the reasoning in this paper has clearly demonstrated that top end social 
media superstars act in a highly professional and commercial environment and do 
not present “ordinary people” accidentally being a “one-of-us”-star.18 Instead, they 
are part of a profit-maximising entertainment industry including commercial plat-
forms, commercial agencies (e.g. multichannel networks), professional consultants, 
and the online advertising industry. Therefore, the issue of authenticity needs to be 
                                                            
18  While the narrative of “ordinary people stars” may have some credibility for the early days of social 
media, the professionalisation of social media entertainment is, by now, a well-established devel-
opment (inter alia, Kim 2012, Döring 2014). 
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put into perspective: most of the top stars have teams behind them to support dif-
ferent stages of commercial content creation – from content conception over pro-
duction to distribution. Strategic staging and content adjustments to audience pref-
erences are as prevalent on YouTube & Co as it is in traditional media (perhaps even 
more so due to algorithmic selection and availability of personalised data). Moreover, 
instead of just being “unfiltered”, stars need to adapt their content according to 
platform standards, regulations, and policies to ensure that it is not deleted.19 Even-
tually, next to the big commercial platforms, the “old” media giants gain influence 
in social media entertainment and stardom (see sections 3.2 and 3.3). 
So, what may be a success factor here is much more perceived authenticity than 
authenticity itself: as long as stars are perceived as being authentic, it does not mat-
ter whether they really are authentic or not. The perception of authenticity, however, 
is subjective and depends on the perceiving individual. Whether social media stars 
are perceived as being authentic or not may crucially depend on the age of the per-
ceivers: while a teenager may view gaming, unboxing or make-up stars as being very 
authentic, older people may come to the opposite perception. Identification – a rel-
evant driving-force of perceived authenticity – considerably correlates with factors 
like same age, same interests, same worldviews, etc. When, as in the studies we are 
aware of (like Google 2016), people between 13 and 19 assess social media stars as 
more authentic than traditional stars, this may also be rooted in a generation effect. 
Every generation favours its new stars and – most probably – perceives them as being 
more authentic than the stars of their parents’ generation. Incidentally, the normal 
generation change of stars in the 2010s coincides with the switch of the main enter-
tainment media technology from TV to social media (Budzinski & Lindstädt-Dreusicke 
2018) in the younger generation.  
The second dimension of authenticity and accessibility relates to an enhanced fan-
star interaction. The possibility to directly and immediately comment on any of the 
star’s content (via posts, likes, etc.) together with the possibility of the star to directly 
react to comments (via answering fans’ comments in posts, videos or livestreams but 
                                                            
19  A popular example is the YouTuber Pewdiepie (Felix Kjellberg) who posted anti-Semitic videos and 
caused YouTube and Disney to cut ties with him (Winkler et al. 2017). 
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also via re-posting comments or contents from fans) may dissolve the traditional 
audience-star dichotomy, leading to a true dialog between fans and stars (Marwick 
2015). In doing so, it enhances the accessibility and (perceived) authenticity of the 
star. 
Now, of course, fan-star interaction is not per se novel. In the traditional media 
world, fans wrote emails and letters to their stars, asking for autographs and posing 
questions and comments. The main difference in the social media world is that dig-
itisation and the internet have drastically reduced the costs of communication. Fol-
lowing fundamental economic logic, lower costs and accompanying prices increase 
demand, therefore, it is not surprising that lower costs of fan-star communication 
enhance fan-star interaction. Furthermore, the costs of geography have also been 
massively reduced by digitisation and the internet. As a consequence, the costs of 
“bundling” one’s own fan community have decreased in online entertainment and a 
social media star may reach its global fan base at significantly lower costs.  
While the phenomenon is not new per se, its increasing quantity may come with a 
new quality. The ubiquitous availability of interaction options may turn fan-star in-
teraction into a success factor since a social media star is in a better position to dif-
ferentiate himself or herself from other social media stars by means of a more active 
fan management strategy. However, it should not be overlooked that the costs of 
fan management (time, manpower, etc.) still increase with the number of (communi-
cating) fans despite the low communication costs. This implies, first, that social me-
dia stars need to select which posts to answer and what fan-made content to re-
post. Second, a personal handling of the fan-star interaction becomes more and 
more difficult with a growing fan community. While smaller and medium stars may 
still keep directly in touch with their fans – and, thus, fuel their perceived authenticity 
– the pressure on (top) superstars considerably increases with growing fame; forcing 
them to outsource certain tasks. Thus, they tend to rely on professional teams man-
aging major parts of the fan-star communication. Whether this is still perceived as 
authentic, depends on the quality of the managing team. 
Thus, the role of fan-star interaction as a success factor for social media stars can be 
considered as non-linear and dynamic. It may be an important factor for rising stars 
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as long as they are on their (early) way towards superstardom. However, top stars 
with millions of subscribers will not be able to personally respond to “baskets of fan 
letters” daily. Eventually, the interaction intensity is likely to drop with a growing fan 
community. This is supported by empirical evidence on Instagram-stars, where the 
interaction strongly decreases for accounts with more than 1,000 followers (see Fig-
ure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Interaction on Instagram according to Followers (2017)20 
Pauriol (2017) 
 
In summary, there is no convincing theory why authenticity should be a success fac-
tor between social media stars, rather than perceived authenticity being a slight dif-
ference compared to stars of tradition media. As the analysis shows, social media 
stars are far from being simply ordinary people (see also chapter 3.2 and 3.4) and 
fan-star interaction has increased, but loses impact with growing popularity. Further-
more, the literature often neglects that authenticity is not necessarily connected to 
positive or entertaining values. Being “authentic” automatically implies a positive 
connotation, but a truly criminal person may also be very authentic in what he or she 
is doing. Would that be positive or fuel star potential? 
                                                            
20  The study includes 740,000 Twitter, Facebook and Instagram profiles. Exact details on the respec-
tive Instagram accounts and the measurement of interaction are not mentioned in the source.  
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Empirical research on the effects of perceived authenticity on social media stardom 
represents a research gap. The existing literature attempts to measure whether per-
ceived authenticity is a factor in the appeal of social media stars for younger audi-
ences (compared to traditional media stars). However, it fails to control for alterna-
tive explanations.  
 
4. Implications and Conclusion: The Role of the New Light 
In this paper, we review existing theories of the economics of superstars, originally 
developed for stars in traditional media, and discuss whether they are still applicable 
for stars in social media (chapter 2). Moreover, we analyse potentially new and ad-
ditional factors for creating superstardom in social media that may be special to the 
nature of social media (chapter 3). Our overall result is that the economics of super-
stars remain applicable and relevant for social media stars, although the occurrence 
and shape of the effects contains social media specifics. Thus, one result is that not 
everything is new in the social media world compared to the traditional media world 
and many underlying mechanisms merely appear in a new light through the windows 
of old theory. In line with this assessment, we find that several (allegedly) new star 
factors in social media turn out to be either not new, not (properly) applicable or 
only partly different to factors concerning classic media stars. However, we also do 
find some elements that are not captured by traditional superstar theories and that 
are relevant for social media superstardom. Table 3 provides an overview of the suc-
cess factors (traditional versus social media stardom) and the results of the analysis. 
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Table 3: Success Factors – Social Media Stars vs. Traditional Stars 
(I) 
Not Applicable 
(II) 
Unchanged 
(III) 
Partly Different 
(IV) 
Novel 
Superstar vs. Ce-
lebrity 
(distinction does 
not fit) 
(2.2) 
Talent  
(2.1) 
Network effects  
(stronger)  
(2.5) 
Algorithm Manage-
ment 
(3.2) 
UCG, Prosumer, 
Democratainment  
(economically not 
applicable)  
(3.1, 3.3) 
Market Concentration  
(2.3) 
Role of Gatekeepers 
(no complete omission 
of gatekeepers, up-
coming new ones)  
(3.3) 
Upload Strategies  
(3.4) 
 Risk-aversion, Infor-
mation Deficiencies  
(2.4) 
Specific Investments 
and Audience Building  
(more self-reliant, 
within the stars influ-
ence) 
(3.4) 
 
 Perceived Authenticity: 
“Only” Ordinary People  
(3.5) 
Perceived Authenticity: 
Accessibility and Star-
Fan Interaction  
(lower cost, higher fre-
quency)  
(3.5) 
 
(I) The distinction between self-made superstars and manufactured celebrities 
does not fit contemporary superstardom in the social media world. The 
“new” concept of user generated content (and thus all related approaches) 
are not applicable from an economic point of view, as the distinction be-
tween the economic roles (producer and consumer) still exists. 
(II) With respect to the traditional economics of superstars, the role of talent, 
market concentration effects as well as dynamic effects of risk-aversion and 
information deficiencies (MacDonald-effects) are present in a comparable 
way in social media. We summarise supporting first empirical evidence 
where available. Regarding new star factors discussed in various strings of 
literature, we find several factors not to be properly convincing. The role 
of authenticity is particularly difficult, since it mingles different perspec-
tives and is still under-researched. The analysis shows that social media 
stars are as far from being ordinary people as traditional stars. 
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(III) Still, the overall perceived authenticity and accessibility of stars tends to be 
higher and the cost of communication lower in social media markets. How-
ever, this merely differentiates social media stars from traditional stars, ra-
ther than serves as a new success factor to explain superstardom within 
social media, i.e. success in the competition among potential social media 
stars. Like every star, social media stars have to draw attention, build an 
audience and invest in their “star genesis”, but are more independent in 
doing so. In the case of gatekeepers, the underlying mechanisms of gate-
keeping display considerable changes; yet, there is no complete extinction 
of gatekeepers and the effects for superstardom remain very similar. Fi-
nally, network externalities (Adler-effects) are also very comparable to clas-
sic media markets, though the nature of the market strongly increases the 
effects. 
(IV) We identify two success factors that are significantly different to the tradi-
tional media world: algorithm management and upload strategies. Both 
refer to behavioural scope for social media stars that did not exist in the 
traditional media world. Managing algorithmic search and recommenda-
tion systems and optimising upload frequencies is indispensable if poten-
tial stars want to stand out among the considerable bulk of contents on 
social media platforms and (i) reach the attention of the audience, (ii) build 
a growing audience for themselves, and (iii) maintain the growth of the 
audience into superstardom. This task is unique to social media and com-
plements traditional superstar mechanisms which remain relevant. It is a 
task that requires skills and competences. 
As such, the notion that everyone can easily become a star in the social media world 
is misleading. At first sight, it does appear to be easy to become famous on social 
media. You stream your favourite video game or publish your everyday makeup rou-
tine and, voilà, just by making your daily routines and hobbies publicly available, you 
become a star. In reality the content production of social media stars consumes a lot 
of time. According to the study of Zabel et al. (2017), German commercial YouTubers 
invest 26.2 hours per week on average in the production of content only, not count-
ing administrative work (as e.g. networking with advertising partners, agencies or 
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partner accounts). In addition to the invested time, the stars also need to handle the 
publicity and the pressure of constant upload necessity. To succeed in the long run, 
build and maintain an audience, it is vital to constantly create new content and have 
the creativity or expertise to do so. The initial investment to reach attention and gen-
erate traffic is mandatory, even if it takes years to become famous. As discussed in 
chapter 0, the talent of social media stars is multidimensional and varies between 
different categories. Not only the core talent (e.g. skills of a gamer in the gaming 
sector), but also additional skills like entertaining talent and technical/digital skills 
are necessary. Being a social media star requires the robustness to put yourself into 
public, create your own content and publish your ideas. The constant demand for 
further content needs to be fed in order to succeed in the long run. Thus, it seems 
not likely that every “ordinary” person combines all qualities which are necessary to 
become a social media star. Not only the core talent and personality, but also the 
determination and commitment to constantly feed the audience are required. That 
is why we follow Turner’s argumentation: “It is important to remember that celebrity 
still remains a systematically hierarchical and exclusive category, no matter how 
much it proliferates” (Turner 2006: 157). 
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Appendix 
Table 4: Overview Content Communities 
Platform Parent Com-
pany 
Estimated 
Revenue/ Prof-
its 
Content Up-
loads 
Active Users Number of Top 
Stars21 
YouTube Google LLC Estimated reve-
nue (world-
wide) 
2014: USD 4 
billion 
2015: USD 6 
billion 
 
Digital ads 
2016: USD 2.92 
billion  
(Prediction 
2018: USD 4.43 
billion) 
400 videos/h 
(2015) 
 
1.9m/month 
(2019) 
Total: 46 
Tech: 6 
Food: 4 
Home: 1 
Beauty: 7 
Fitness: 1 
Gaming: 8 
Travel: 2 
Entertainment: 7 
Parenting: 1 
Fashion: 1 
Kids: 8 
Vimeo InterAc-
tiveCorp 
Sales target  
2019: USD 100 
million 
 80m/total 
(2018) 
Total: 0 
Twitch Ama-
zon.com, Inc.  
(Twitch Inter-
active, Inc.) 
Estimated reve-
nue (world-
wide) 
2017: USD 1.7 
billion 
 550,530/month 
(2017) 
Total: 2 
Gaming: 2 
 
MySpace Time Inc.  Digital ads 
2010: USD 274 
million 
 13.32m/total 
(USA, 2016) 
Total: 1 
Beauty: 1 
 
Insta-
gram 
Facebook Inc. Digital ads in 
the US: 
2016: USD 1.61 
billion  
(Prediction 
2018: USD 5.4 
billion) 
95m pics/day 
(2016) 
1.0m/month 
(2019) 
Total: 13 
Home: 2 
Beauty: 2 
Fitness: 5 
Travel: 1 
Entertainment: 1 
Parenting: 1 
Fashion: 1 
Pinterest Cold Brew 
Labs, Inc. 
Estimated reve-
nue (world-
wide): 
2017: USD 500 
million 
 200m/month 
(2017)  
Total: 1 
Home: 1  
                                                            
21  According to Forbes’ (2018) top ten rankings per category (excluding pets, private blogs and vlogs). 
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Twitter Twitter Inc. Estimated reve-
nue (world-
wide): 
2017: USD 
2.443 million 
Losses (world-
wide): 
2017: USD 
108.06 million 
500m 
tweets/day 
(2015) 
6000 tweets/s 
(2017) 
335m/month 
(2018) 
Total: 4 
Tech: 3 
Fitness: 1 
 
Tumblr Oath Inc. 
(Until 2017: 
Yahoo) 
 163.1b 
posts/total 
(2018) 
357m/month 
(2017) 
Total: 0 
Sources: (Castillo 2018, Chatterjee & Aripaka 2018, Honsel 2018, Vimeo 2018, Winkler 2015, Wuttig 
2018) 
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